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INTRODUCTION
The District Court has entered a judgment upon a summary judgment motion
against Appellant KAL, LLC, hereinafter "KAL", imposing upon a ten acre parcel of
real estate owned by KAL, a perpetual and express easement for ingress, egress and
utilities for the benefit of an adjoining parcel that is owned by the Marian B. Baker
Trust dated May 12, 2013, hereinafter "Baker Trust". This easement traverses the
entire south to north dimension via a winding route across the center of KAL's
property. This easement imposes a significant burden on the property of KAL. The
District Court has imposed this burden upon KAL despite an absence of any grant of
such an easement to Baker Trust or its predecessor in interest, Jose I. Melendreras and
Jacqueline Z. Melendreras, hereinafter "Melendreras" in any conveyance document of
record. The Court can correct this manifest error by reversing the decision of the
District Court holding that the relevant deed is ambiguous, vacating the judgment
entered by the District Court and remanding the case to the District Court for a trial on
the merits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case about a claimed easement across two ten acre parcels of land in
Kootenai County near State Line, Idaho. In late 1998 or early 1999 one Jerry
Mortensen, the owner of Timberland-AG, LLC, built a logging road, now sometimes
referred to as Alexana Lane, across the two parcels to support his timber removal
project. The two parcels were among four rectangular ten acre parcels that are
pertinent to this case. The parcels all shared a common corner. When Timberland-AG
sold the two western parcels in 1999 to Melendreras Mortensen executed a deed that
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

did not contain language granting to Melendreras a right to use the relevant logging
road that crossed the two eastern parcels. A legal description of the centerline of the
logging road was attached to the above referenced deed. The deed referenced the
logging road in two instances. First as a reservation to Timberland-AG of a right to use
that portion of the logging road that crossed one of the two parcels it sold. The second
reference was to establish the easternmost end of an easement which it deeded to
Melendreras along the north boundary of the KAL, LLC parcel which is the
northernmost of the two eastern parcels.
Baker Trust is the successor in interest to Melendreras in ownership of the
northernmost of the two western parcels. Baker Trust has sought permission from
Kootenai County to construct a residence on its property. Baker Trust has asserted a
claim that Timberland-AG agreed to give Melendreras an easement over the logging
road to access the northernmost of the two parcels he purchased from Timberland-AG
in 1999. KAL, LLC is the owner of the northernmost of the two eastern parcels that
are traversed by the logging road having purchased the parcel in 2002. KAL, LLC
asserts that the deed from Timberland-AG to Melendreras did not grant to
Melendreras the claimed easement. Several easement theories were plead in the case
including easement by implication and pursuant to LC. 55-603.
The trial court granted Baker Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment holding
that the deed from Timberland-AG to Melendrerases is ambiguous and that Mortensen,
on behalf of Timberland-AG intended to grant to Melendreras an express easement
over the logging road to access the parcel now owned by Baker Trust. The trial court
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found material issues of disputed fact pertaining to all other easement theories
advanced in the case and denied the motion for summary judgment as to those theories.
The trial court erroneously found the deed to be ambiguous because it created
an "absurdity" under one of its interpretations. The alternate interpretation in the
view of the trial court was reasonable. In making its determination the trial court failed
to apply the proper legal standard and analysis to the issue of ambiguity. The trial
court further erred in determining that though there is not any language in the deed to
support its interpretation of the word it found to be ambiguous, "RESERVING", as
granting an easement to Melendreras over the logging road, Mortensen's must have
intended such an easement in deeding the property to Melendreras. The trial court then
imposed the easement over the logging road. This Court should examine the record,
apply its own analysis of whether the deed is ambiguous in the manner determined by
the trial court, reverse the trial court on its finding of ambiguity and subsequent grant
of an easement to Baker Trust as Melendreras' successor in interest. This Court should
determine that the deed is not ambiguous as a matter of law and leave to the trial court
the issue of whether any other easement theory gives Baker Trust the right to use the
logging road as it traverses the property owned by KAL, LLC.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the District Court err in holding that the deed from Timberland-AG to

Melendreras is ambiguous?
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2. Did the District Court err in interpreting the language of the 1999 deed from
Timberland-AG to Melendreras as granting to Melendreras an easement over
the logging road?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court decided this case in the context of a summary judgment
motion. The standard of review in a similar case was articulated by this Court as
follows:
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment using the same
standard as the district court when it originally ruled on the motion. Carl H.
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,870,993 P.2d 1197, 1201
(1999). Therefore, we affirm summary judgment when "pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). On summary judgment, the Court
liberally construes all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and draws all
reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Hill v.
Hill, 140 Idaho 812,813, 102 P.3d 1131, 1132 (2004). We deny summary
judgment if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence. Id. If no disputed issues of material
fact exist, then only a question of law remains. In/anger v. City of Salmon, 137
Idaho 45, 47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2003). This Court exercises free review over
questions of law. Id.

Camp Easton Forever, Inc. vs. Inland Northwest Council Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 156
Idaho 893, 332 P.3d 805, 809 (2014). More recently this Court said, "This Court
reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo, and this Court's
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment. Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 301,385 P.3d 856
(2016).
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ARGUMENT

A. The District Court erred in holding that the 1999 deed from Timberland AG,
LLC, (Mortensen) is ambiguous.
The District Court issued its decision in this case from the bench. There is no
record of the decision of the District Court except the transcript of the hearing at which
its decision was delivered on June 29, 2016. A complete copy of the transcript of the
hearing is a part of the record. A copy of that transcript is attached hereto for ease of
reference as Exhibit A to this brief.
The analytical standard for assessing whether or not a deed is ambiguous was
clearly stated by this Court:
When this Court interprets a deed, our primary goal is to give effect to the
parties' real intent. Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 639, 315 P.3 824, 827 (2013).
If a deed's language is ambiguous, the parties' intention becomes a question of
fact settled by a trier of fact. Id. The trier of fact must consider all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances and view the deed as a whole and in its
entirety. Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 773, 118 P.3d 99, 105(2005).
However, "[w]hen an instrument conveying land is unambiguous, the intention
of the parties can be settled as a matter of law using the plain language of the
document" and without using extrinsic evidence. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho
399,404, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008).
A deed is ambiguous when its language is reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretations. Id. A deed is not ambiguous merely because the parties present
differing interpretations to the Court. Hoch 155 Idaho at 639, 315 P3d at 827.
Instead, "conflicting interpretations may arise when a phrase lends itself,
without contortion, to a number of inconsistent meanings." Porter, 146 Idaho at
404, 105 P.3d at 1217. To determine whether a deed is ambiguous, the deed
must be reviewed as a whole. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503,508, 65 P.3d 525,
530 (2003).

Camp Easton Forever, Inc., 156 Idaho at 989-990, 332 P.3d at 811-812.
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The District Court held that a portion of the February 5, 1999 Warranty Deed
from Timberland-AG, LLC to Melendreras is ambiguous. T. June 29, 2016, pp. 5-7.
The particular language is found in Exhibit A to the Warranty Deed, a copy of which is
attached hereto as B. The specific form of Exhibit A to the deed is important to a
proper understanding of the document. The presentation of the relevant language in
the transcript materially differs from its presentation in Exhibit A in that the transcript
combined two paragraphs into one, potentially altering the clear meaning of the
language in Exhibit A. The language appears in Exhibit A to the deed after a metes and
bounds description of the northernmost of the two parcels, Parcel 2, purchased by
Melendreras as follows:
RESERVING THEREFROM a strip of land sixty (60) feet in width paralleling
the north boundary line of Parcel 2 which shall serve as an easement for ingress,
egress and utilities.
TOGETHER WITH a sixty (60) foot easement of the purpose of ingress, egress
and utilities along the north boundary line of Tract 9, legally described in
Exhibit "C" and west of the Ingress, Egress and Utilities easement described in
Exhibit "B".
SAID EASEMENTS and all conditions, and restrictions relating thereto shall be
considers as running with the land and shall bind the grantees and its heirs,
executors, and administrators, and all future assigns of said premises or any
part thereof.
R. at page 78. It is notable that the same format, meaning a metes and bounds
description of a conveyed parcel followed by reservations and another grant related to
of portions of the described parcel was used earlier in Exhibit A to the deed.
The District Court observed that the above recited language from Exhibit A to
the deed "could reserve to Timberlake and easement across Tracts 7 and 8 that it sold
to Melendreas, but that language would not and should not and could not reserve to
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itself an easement across the rest of the tracts that Timberland continued to own. That
would be an unreasonable reading of the intent of that language, that TimberlakeTimberland would be reserving to itself an easement through land that it currently
owned at the time of the conveyance". T. June 29, 2016, p.7, ll.17-25. The District Court
later commented in the same hearing as follows:
The Court: The Court focuses I think on the word-the wording of the deed,
that the Court took some time to find of reserving. So the Court finds that to be
an ambiguous phrase in the context of the entire deed in that the literal reading
of that deed with respect to that word "reserving", it creates an absurdity in the
Court's mind that Timberland was reserving to itself an easement through land
it already owned.
Mr. Covington: Okay.
The Court: Therefore, the Court finds that the intent of the grantor was to grant
an easement to the Melendreas and to reserve to itself an easement only throur.h
the properties that it just conveyed to the Melendreas.

T. June 29, 2016, pp. 13-14. Thus the District Court's analysis concludes that the word
"RESERVNG" to be ambiguous having one meaning that creates an absurdity and
another, which is a reasonable interpretation that Timberland was reserving an
easement across property it was conveying and grant an easement to Melendreras. The
grant to Melendreras in the deed plainly says sixty feet along the north boundary of
Tract 9, a parcel that was retained at the time by Timberland. "A deed is ambiguous
when its language is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Camp Easton

Forever, Inc., 156 Idaho at 900, 332 P3.d at 812. The District Court erred in holding the
deed to be ambiguous when only one interpretation is reasonable and the other is a
contortion generating an absurd meaning. "Conflicting interpretations may arise when
no potential boundary line unambiguously fits the language contained in the deed."

Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497,500, 112 P3.d 785, 788 (2005). "Neither of the drainage
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ditches, nor the creek channel, unambiguously fit the language contained in the deeds,
making the intentions of the drafters unclear." Id. In the case now before this Court
only the interpretation of "RESERVING" meaning an easement to Timberland across
land conveyed to Melendreras and granting an easement to Melendreras sixty feet wide
along a portion of the North boundary line of Tract 9 fits the language in the deed. In
fact, the fit for such an interpretation is perfect. The deed is not ambiguous because
there is only one reasonable interpretation that fits.

B. The District Court erred in interpreting the language of the deed to grant to

Melendreras an easement over the logging road in the deed Timberland-AG,
LLC gave to Melendreras in 1999?
If an ambiguity is determined, "The trier of fact must then determine the intent

of the parties according to the language of the conveyance and the circumstances
surrounding the transaction." Neider, 138 Idaho at 508, 65 P.3d at 530. Having found
the deed to be ambiguous, the District Court further erred in adding a new easement to
the deed rather than applying its chosen interpretation of the words of the deed. It is as
if the declaration of ambiguity provided a basis in the mind of the District Court to
insert new terms into the deed, meaning a new easement in favor of Melendreras over
the logging road. There is no interpretation presented of "RESERVING" in the
language of the conveyance meaning a new easement over the logging road. In this
respect the District Court's conclusion fails the test of Neider because the language of
the conveyance does not call for a new easement. The decision and should be reversed.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in finding that the 1999 deed from Timberland-AG,
LLC to Melendreras is ambiguous in its use of the word "RESERVING". The meaning
of the term in the context of the deed is clear, logical and consistent with the pattern
and language used by the drafter throughout the document of conveyance. As the deed
is truly unambiguous, its meaning is clear that an easement was reserved in favor of the
grantor, Timberland-AG, LLC, over a portion of Tract 8 and Melendreras were
granted an easement over a portion along the north boundary line of Tract 9. Even if
the deed were ambiguous there is no meaning of "RESERVING" that includes a grant
of a new and different easement. The deed contains no grant of an easement to
Melendreras over the logging road, Alexana Lane. The judgment should be vacated,
the deed held to be unambiguous and the matter remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings.
Dated this 29th day of June, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of June, 2017, I caused to be served a true
and accurate copy of the foregoing instrument by placing the same in the United States
Mail, First Class, postage prepaid thereon, to the following:
Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks,
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax: 208-664-1684
/

William A. Fuhrman
Jones, Gledhill, Fuhrman, Gourley
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820
P.O. Box 1097
,,.Wdise, ID 8 701
,/ Fax: 2 - 1-1
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IN 'IHE SUPREME COlJRI' OF 'IHE Sl'A1E OF IDA!D

MARIAN B. BAKER,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PROCEEDINGS

IXXl<El' # 44855
CASE N:J. CV-2015-0001484

I<l\L, LLC, et al.,

THE COURT: We're on the record in the matter of
Baker vs. Stadler, et al. This is Civil Case 15-1484

Defemants.

And in the matter Mr. Stephen McCrea is in court
representing plaintiff. And Mr. Ben Slaughter is appearing
telephonically on behalf of the plaintiff as well.

HEARIN3
June 29, 2016

Mr. Art Macomber is present representing
defendants John and Vickie Stadler.

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs:

Mr. Robert Covington is present representing KAL,

STEPHEN McCREA
WAYNE BENJAMIN SLl\lGfiER III
Lake City law Groop, PL1C

LLC.

435 West Hanley, SUite 101
d'Alene, ID 83815

Jose and Jaqueline Melendreas are presentin court

Coeur

today. They are self represented litigants.

This is the time set for the Court to announce its

For the Defendants:
ROBERT ffiVIN:m)N

decision regarding plaintifls' motion for summary judgmeni
but I have one housekeeping matterfirst, and that is that I
wanted to inquire Mr. McCrea.

8884 North Goverrurent Way, suite A
Hayden, ID 83835
ARIHUR MA<XMBER

Attorney at Law
1900 Northwest Blvd., Suite 100
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

APPEAL FRCM DISIRICT CDURI' OF

nm

nm

There is an original proposed order in the Court's
file, an order for entry of default, and it's listing a
default against parties Karen Charbonneau, Jay From kin,
Don Stephens and Gail Stephens, but it's under this case
number and this case caption.

FIRST JUDICIAL DISIRICT OF

STI\.'IE OF IDI\IKl IN AND FCR 'lHE CDUNIY OF l<[XJllNAI

'IllE

!IH)RABI£

IANSIN3 HAYNES PRESIDDC

3

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
IO
11
12
13

14
15
16

Do you know what that's about?
MR. McCREA: They were named defendants, I
believe.

4
1
2
3

The Court has certainly reviewed thewritten
submissions of the parties. It listened carefully to the
oral arguments the other day regarding plaintiffs motion

4
5
6
7
pleadings.
8
MR. McCREA: The original case caption, I believe
they were named defendants, and they declined to appear or
9
10
plead.
THE COURT: Okay.
11
MR. McCREA: And so they were notified we wouldn't 12

for summary judgment. And ru cut to the chase right away
and say the Court is going to grant plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment
Some of the facts that a rein the record that the
Court has considered include that Timbedand Ag owned
Tracts 5 through 12 of the subject property originally, or
at least at the origination of the facts before this Court
Alexanna Lane -- or Alexanna Lanecrosses from I
think north to south, anyway, Lots 5, 6, 11, 10, 7,

assess costs against them.
THE COURT: All right. All right. That explains

13
14

recrosses back into 10, and again -- or again, then crosses
Tract 9.

that.

15
16

Timberland Ag used this Alexanna Lane for itl own
purposes when it owned all eight of those tracts in order to

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. McCREA: And they -THE COURT: I never saw that in any of the

You know, now that I am looking at your -- I

17

didn't see it in one of the earlier pleadings, but now I do

17

access Tract 8 of that property.

18
19

see those names, so thank you for clarifying that.
All right. The Courfs ready to makean oral

18
19

In 1999 a warranty deed conveying property was
executed from TimberlandAg to Jose and Jaqueline

20

pronouncement then today on defendants' motion for summary

21
22
23
24
25

judgment, and so -- excuse me - plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment And so the findings articulated by the
Court today and the conclusions articulated by the Court are
those findings and conclusions thatsupport the ultimate
decision of the Court.

20
21
22
23
24
25

Melendreas, that conveyed to the Melendreases ownership in
Tracts 7 and 8 of the subject properties.That conveyance by
warranty deed included easement language, that has been the
subject of this dispute.
That warranty deed also referencedand
incorporated Exhibits 8, which the Court-- Exhibit B,

f"'"····

;e

5

6

1
2

excuse me, which the Court finds to be the legal description
of Alexanna Lane,and also Exhibit C, which the Court finds

1
2

3
4

to be the description of what's been called I thinkfor ease
the 60-foot easement stripofland that runs from Tract9
into Tract 8.

3
4

5

There is evidence in the record, although it's not

of a reserved easementby written instrument.
The deed language that has been at issu~ the deed
from Timberland to the Melendreases, this Court finds as a
matter oflaw to bean ambiguous document.

5

The Court finds it to be ambiguous because of the

6

language in that regarding the reservation ofan easement in

6
7

necessarily germane to the Court's finding, but the Court

7

that language. And I should -- the Court should probably

8

did make a note of it, that the Melendreas party has

8

cite all of that subject language here.
Let me find it.

9

improved Alexanna Lane, at least at some degree after buying

9

10

property, the tracts mentioned above in 1999, and claimed

10

11

use of Alexanna Lane itself, the Melendreses to access Tract

11

12

Number 8.

12
13

The record should reflect that the KAL party

13

Just one momentwhile I try to find that.
The subject language that was at dispute her~
that the Court finds to be language that createsan
ambiguity in this warranty deed reads as follows:

14

bought Tract 9 in 2002. The Stadlers brought Tract 10 in

14

15

2006.

15

60 feet in width parallelling the north boundary of

16
17

for ingresi.-egress and utilities. Together with a 60-foot

Melendreases sold Tract 8 to the plaintiff in

16
17

2014, together with a deed and an easement to access

18
19
20

Tract 8, the same easement access that isAlexanna Lane,
that was the subject of Exhibit B of the warranty deed from
Timbe.-Iand Agto the Melendreases.
In this matter plaintiff has argued that they have

"It was reserving therefrom a strip of land
Parcel 2, which is Tract 8, which shall serve as an easement

19
20

easement for the same purpose ofingress~gress and
utilities, along the north boundary line of Tract 9, legally
described in Exhibit C, and west of the ingresi.-egress

18

21

utilities easement described inExhibit B.

Melendreases, and -- and also, not only that lane itself,

22
23

restrictions relating thereto shall be consider.;" --

24

but the extension or the property described in Exhibit C of

24

spelling error -- "as running with the land, and shall bind

25

the warranty deed of 1999, extension into Tract 8 by virtue

25

the grantees and its heirs, executors, administrators,and

21
22
23

an easement for all ofAlexanna Lane conveyed to them by the

"Said easements and all conditions and

8

7

1
2

all future assigns of said premisesof any part thereof."
So, that was the nature of the language that this

1
2

3
4

Court found to create in this warranty deed an ambiguity,
such that it is an ambiguous document. Therefore, because

3
4

5
6

that document, that warranty deed is ambiguous on its face,
or a latent ambiguity, even as argued by the parties, but

5

This Court therefore concludes, based on the
record before it, that there is no contraryevidence, and,
therefore, no genuine issue of material fact that Timberland

6

intended to grant an easement-- that other than Timberland
intended to grant an easement to Melendreases to cross
Tracts 5, 6, 11, 10 and 9 all the way into Tract 8. And in

7

the Court finds it to be even patently ambiguous as well.

7

the same document to reserve itself-- to itself an easement

8

Therefore, the intent of the grantor is a matter of fact to

8

9

be determined either on summary judgment or at trial on the

9

to cross Sections7 and 8 that it had just sold to the
Melendreases. Therefore, this Court finds specific that

10

matter.

10

Melendreases specifically and expresslygranted to plaintiff

11

the easement rights that it had received fromTimberlake --

ambiguity in the Timberlake [sic) deed, that the deed
reserves to Timberlake an easement>ver the property it sold

12
13

Timberland. I keep saying Timberlake; it's Timberland
The Court therefore finds that the theory

14

propounded by plaintiffs that they have an easemen~

15

to Melendreases.
This Court finds that language to be ambiguous

15

reserved easementby written instrument is a valid, and

16
17

because the legal description of the easementin the grant
to Mr. and Mrs. Melendreas could reserve to Timberlake an

18

easement acrossTracts 7 and 8 that it sold to the

16
17
18

there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the
intent of the grantor Timberland
Now, for pu1·poses ofpotential review, the Court

19

Melendreases, but that language would not and should not and

19

has analyzed the other theories that plaintiff has proposed.

20

could not reserve to itself an easement across the rest of

20

The plaintiff proposed they had an easement by

the tracts that Timberland continued to own. That would be

21

implied prior use. The Court finds that there are genuine

an unreasonable reading ofthe intent of that language, that
Timberlake -- Timberlandwould be reserving to itself an

22
23

issues of material fact in this instance regarding the
elemenls of that theory of what is called continuous long
use, long enough before conveyance to show that the use was
intended to be permanent. That may or may not be the case.

11

12
13

14

21
22
23

Defendants Stadlers have argued that there is no

24

easementthrough land that it currently owned at the time of

24

25

the conveyance.

25

9

10

1

There were issues of fact regarding that continuous use such

1

plaintiffs.

2

that it was intended to be permanent, and cannot grant

2

3
4

easement or the relief sought by plaintiff under that
theory.

3

Also, the Court -- the plaintiffs proposed a
theory of relief for themselves on an easement by transfer

5

Plaintiffs propounded the theory of easement by

6
7

necessity. This Court finds that there are genuine issues
of fact regarding great present necessity foran easement

8

That may or may not be the case. That would need to have

9

been decided at trial on the merits.

10

The plaintiffs propounded the theory of easement

4

from Melendreas to Baker pursuant to Idaho CodeSection

5
6
7

55-603. Again, the Court finds that there are genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the easement was
obviously and permanently used by the Melendreases.

8
9

The Court simply makes those particular findings
for purposes of potential further review

10

With that, then, and based on those findings and

11

by prescriptio1L The Court finds there are genuine issues

12
13

of fact 1·egarding whether the use was by permissio11 the use
of the parties involved here washy permission of the

13

Are there any questions from the plaintiff?

14

servient estate, and the basis -- primarily based on the

14

MR. McCREA: No, Your Honor.

15

affidavit of David White that Mr. Melendreas at some point

15

THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Macomber?

16

had asked if White minded if Mr. Melendreas was on White's

17

property. The Court finds that to be a small piece of

16
17

MR.MACOMBER: Yes, YourHonor. ljustwantto
clarify that the notes you just gave on thegenuine issues

18

evidence, but one that fits into a genuine issue of material

18

of fact related to the other ofplaintifrs claims are not

19
20

fact about whether the use by Mr. and Mrs. Melendreas, orby
the -- no, not by Timberland, but by the Melendreases was

19

included in the summary judgment but the summary judgment

21
22
23

with permissio1L Nevertheless, whether Mr.Melendreas
thought he needed permissioq or whether-- whether
Mr. White thought he could give permissioq that's a moot

20
21

is just on what they motioned for, which was the Stadler's
counterclaims?

22
23

24
25

point because this Court finds that an express easement was
granted to the Melendreases, and then likewise to the

24
25

11
12

conclusions, again the Court grants plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment

THE COURT: Yes.
Well, say that again.
Now, I thought I followed you, and then I lost
you.

11
1

MR. MACOMBER: Well, the motion for summary

2
3

judgment was brought against theStadler's counterclaims
only. And so none of the claims of the-- the other claims

4
5

of the plaintiffs, or the claims ofKAL, or the claims of
Melendreas, or Bakeragainst Melendreas are settled here.
THE COURT: Mr. McCrea, what's your position on

6

12
1

easement, and, therefore, although the motion for summary

2
3
4
5

judgment only sought to dismiss the counterclaims otStadler
and KAL, it effectively has had a dispositive effect on -on the counterclaim that-- or I guess the first amended
complaint that's being filed, or I guess will at this point

7

that?

6
7

in time it should be entered into the Court for filing for
acceptance of the order that's been proposed wherein the

8
9
10
11

That's a good -- that's a good point.
MR. McCREA: Right.
Your Honor, the original case sought to quiet
title to the easement foringress and egress should cross

8
9
10
11

plaintiff is seeking affirmativerelief, declaring the right
to use all Alexanna Lane, and one of the theories is that
there's an express grant of easement as the Court just
found. And so I -- I don't think that we need to -- if I

12

the northern boundary ofTract8. The counterclaim alleged

12

understood Mr. Macomber'squestion, is -- is he's thinking

13

that there was no easement to that parcel at all and so,

13

that we need to go through some more procedural hoops tog et

14

therefore, the motion for summary judgmentwas in response

14

to the point where the Court would affirmatively grant the

15

to that counterclaim.

15

relief being sought in the first amended complairt that's in

16

THE COURT: Thank you for that.

16

the process of being filed. I think that-- I think it's

17

I'm glad you pointed that out. That clarifies

17

kind of a procedural-- it's unnecessary for us to go

18
19

that. Thank you, Mr. Macomber.
MR. SLAUGHTER: Your Honor, can I weigh in for

18

through any more hoops. I think at this time judgment would

19

be appropriate to -- for the Court to declare that there is

20
21
22
23
24

that?
THE COURT: You may, Mr. Slaughter. Go ahead.
MR. SLAUGHTER: I apologize.
And maybe I'm misunderstanding,but I think that
the Court's ruling was that there's an express finding that

20
21
22
23

a right to use the easementfor -- for the benefit of Baker
to have access along Alexanna Lane, and the Tract9 easement
in order to reach Tract8.
THE COURT: Well, thank you.

25

the -- the easement, or that the deed in question granted an

24
25

That may be the case. And the Court realized it
was being a bit expansive here, and I think in analyzing the

13

14

1

summary judgmentmotion with respect to the counterclaim

1

2

established, I think the Court had to address really many of

2

intent of the grantor was to grant an easement to the

3

the other theories as well. So, that may or may not be the

3

Melendreasesand to reserve to itself an easement only

4

case. And when-- I was going to ask the parties, after I

5

asked them if there was any questions, where they thought

4
5

through the properties that it just conveyed to the
Melendreases.

6

the -- that this decision left the status of this case. And

6

MR. COVINGTON: Okay. I think I got it

7

so we'll find out about that in a moment But I thank you

8

for your thoughts on that.

7
8

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Any other questions?

THE COURT: Therefore, the Court finds that the

9

Any other questions, Mr. Macomber'!

9

Mr. Melendreas,any questions from yoi/!

10

MR. MACOMBER: No, Your Honor:

10

MR. MELENDREAS: No, sir. No, Your Honor. I --

11

THE COURT: Mr. Covington, any questions?

11

THE COURT: Mrs. Melendreas, any questions?

12

MR. COVINGTON: Your Honor, I wanted to make suli

MS. MELENDREAS: Yes.

13

I understood where the Court found ambiguity, and I'm trying

14

to recall the Court's description of that. I don't want to

14

15

belabor it unduly, but I want to have a clear picture in my

15

THE COURT: Do have any questions?

16
17

mind.

16
17

I don't want comments I want to know if you have
any questions about the Court's ruling.

THE COURT: The Court focuses I think on the

13

Okay. What you just said was correct because
Timberland Ag still owned the property.

18

word -- the wording of the deed, that the Court took some

19

time to find of reserving. So the Court finds that to be an

19

20
21

ambiguous phrase in the context of the entire deed, in that
the literal reading of that deed with respect to thatword

20
21

22

"reserving", it creates an absurdity in the Court's mind

22

23

that Timberland was reserving to itself an easementthrough

23

status of the case based on the ruling, and the extent to

24

land it already owned.

24

which the Court has entered findings and conclusions?

25

18

MS. MELENDREAS: Not at the moment
THE COURT: Okay. Sorry to cut you off like that,
but I do need to keep it in line of what we're asking here.
So, with that, let me turn to Mr.McCrea and/or
Mr. Slaughter and find out where do you see this leaving the

25

MR. COVINGTON: Okay.

MR. McCREA: I think there-- as to the

15

16

1

original -- plaintiffs original claim, which-- which

1

been resolved We can just skip the procedural mechanisms

2

portion of the case I represent my client on, which was his

2
3

if -- to the extent any remain, in order to just get to the
point, which is my client has the right to use the existing
road to access its property.

3

request to quiet title to the 60-foot easement across

4

Tract 8, that still remains a matter that needs to be

4

litigated if my client intends to continue to pursue that.

5

5

THE COURT: All right.
MR. McCREA: Other than that, I would defer to

6
7

8

9
10

7

And before I inquire of the other parties, that
reminded the Court of an important finding it needed to make

Mr. Slaughter for any further comment.
8
THE COURT: Mr. Slaughter, where do you think this 9

here.

leaves?

Rule 56, which requires the Court to view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, which are

I think youive mentioned it, but go ahead and make

11

12

6

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

your record about where you think this leavesthe case.

10
11
12

MR. SLAUGHTER: Well, Your Honor,I think I even 13

13

The Court has engaged in this analysis pursuant to

the defendants in this case. But also because this is
scheduled as a Court trial, the Court is allowed to draw all

14

addressed it in my reply memorandull\ that I think that

14

reasonable inferences, because it will be the finder of fact

15

effectively, especially since this is a court trial, I don't

15

at a tria~ to draw all reasonable inferences from the

16

see any impediment at this point in time to filing

16

evidence, not necessarily in favor of the nonmoving party,

17

declaratory judgment or quieting title in favor of the Baker

18

Trust for finding an easement, an access easement along

17
18

been the manner in which the Court has engaged in this

19

Alexanna Lane and the Tract 9 easement to the Baker

20
21
22
23
24

no need to go down that path. At least in my opinion, but

25

I'll leave that up to the Court. I believe that the issue's

but as the Court sees them to be reasonable. So, that's
analysis.

property.

19
20

So, I -- procedurally, the first-- the proposed
first amended complailt has not been filed and serve!\ but I
think the nature of the Court'sruling is such that there's

21

this case here? Do you have any input on that at this

22
23

point?

24
25

go back and take a look
THE COURT: Sure. Understood

So, Mr. Macomber, where to yousee the status of

MR. MACOMBER: I don't, Your Honor. I'd have to

17

18

1

How about you, Mr. Covington?

1

2

MR. COVINGTON: Well, certainly the issue that

2

us. Once that potential -- I just want to make sure that

3

that part of the case is separated and cleared What he

3

Steve originally raised in the initial pleading here remains

property, that really, in my opinion, has nothing to do with

4

unresolved, and I think none of us have really focu!l!d much

4

5

effort thus far on even discovery related to the claim. His

5

continues to do on his property is his business beyond this
point.
THE COURT: All right. Thank yotL

6

claim is that it-- excuse me, Steve, ifl am mistakm, but

6

7

generally quieting title under some theory so that my client

7

8

does not have the right to use the 60-acre-- a 60-foot

8

9

easement across Tract8.

9

MR. MELENDREAS: The other thing is well, once
this ruling is in, will the lis pendens be removed?
THE COURT: I don't know. That's -- that's going

IO

Correct me if I'm wrong.

IO

to require some discussion among the parties, I think, or

11

MR. McCREA: No, that's --

11

further motion practice.

MR. COVINGTON: And I don't know exactly what

12

MR. MELENDREAS: Thank you, sir.

theory there is for quieting that title, but that's what

13

THE COURT: Mrs. Melendreas, do you have any inpu1

14

remains, and very little work has been done thus far, I can

14

15

tell the Court, on that issue.

15

MS. MELENDREAS: No, thank yotL

16

THE COURT: And if you do, please speakup.

12

13

16
17

THE COURT: All right. Very good Thank you for
that. That's a good reminder for the Court.

18
19

17

Mr. Melendreas, do you have any input on where you
see the status of the case based on the Court's ruling?
MR. MELENDREAS: What I'd like to bring up,

on the status of this case based on the Court's ruling?

sort of rudely cut you off just a few minutes ago, I don't

18

want you to be quieted by that. If you have something you

19

would like to say about the status, pleasedo.

20

MS. MELENDREAS: (No oral response.)

Your Honor, is I see this case in two parts. One of'em is

21

THE COURT: Okay. Very good.

22

what we've addressed here today as far as showing

22

23

(unintelligible) to Tract 8.

23

20
21

24
25

It's my understanding that if Mr.Espinoza wants
to do this quiet title to remove the easement from his

All right. With that, then, I'm going to ask
Mr. McCrea to present an order to the Court granting

24

plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, or Mr. Slaughter,

25

whichever is the appropriate way, for the reasons, and for

20

19
1

the -- based on the conclusions articulated by the Court

2

today.

3

And then in terms of further proceedings in the

1

Alexanna Laneis truly that whole thing, then it probably

2

includes that -- easement, and if somebody wants to build a

3

dally (phonetic) on the parcel north, Stadlersmay want to

4

matter, I'm simply going to leave it to the parties to

4

build a dally, so it's a little perhaps prematureto just

5

discuss among themselves the status as they see it, and the

5

focus on the 60-footand say that's all that's left

6

court will await then any further motion practice and any

6

7

further notices of hearings, and we'll let the parties drive

7

thinking that needs to be done, more discussion, possibly

8

I guess the next -- the next issues that go fonvard.

8

more motion practice.

thought that we have a trial settingfor sometime in

11

September.

12

THE COURT: Right.

IO
11
12

13

(Off-the-record discussion held.)

13

14

MR. COVINGTON: I don't think my clients going to 14

16

Right now we'll leave that trial setting in place.

MR. COVINGTON: Your Honor, I guess I'll raise the 9

9
10

15

THE COURT: Well, it sounds like there'smore

abandonment the easement. So do you -MR. McCREA: I can't really-- I can't really say.

notice of hearing on vacating the trial, if need be. I sure
like to shoot for those trials dates whenever possible.
All right Based on that, then, thank you all for
a good argument. Thankyou for good briefing and for being

15

willing to listen to the Court today. With that, you are

16

excused

17

We in recess until 2:30.

18

(Proceedings concluded.)

17

I have to discuss with my client at this point

18
19

the request to have that we consider rescheduling the trial

19

20

Steve and I will figure out what we' re going to do. I think

20

21
22

my client has the strongest interest in this easement that

21

is across Steve's property. But I would like to putthat

22

23

out there because we all have plans and stuff.

23

24

THE COURT: All right.

24

25

MR. MACOMBER: Then the other. point being that if 25

MR. COVINGTON: So I'll table -- or I'll put out

The parties can either stipulate with good cause or have

21
1
2

3

4
5

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
16

17

18
19
20

21
22
23

24
25

I, KIM J. HANNAN, do hereby certify that the
foregoing pages nurrbered fron 2-20, constitute a true and
accurate transcript of my stencgraphic notes, taken at said
tirre and place, all done to the best of my skill and
ability.

DATED this 25th Day of August, 2016.

\VARRANTY DEED

TIMHBR~LAND~AG t,,l,,C.
trw ;.:1,m1or(,~·
f do(n,i:) herehy grant, bargain, sell und ecnvey unto

·t]<.

_ ·i1

~
-Qr

Cl.4

:t(1'1p.<:r,ENi)RERAS, n single person a11d JACQUELINE Z. DIAZ, u single person

who:;c c-urrc

I

addrciss is

l '101 sHnRNUN AVIeNUE

the grnntcc(s), the following dolloribed premises, in J<'OOTENAJ County IDAHO, to wit:

SEE A'l'TACHED "EXHIBIT A 11
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD tho said premises, with their nppurtennncos unto the snid Grantee , heirs
und assigns forever. And the said Ora11tor do hereby covenant to &nd with the said Granteo(s), that (ll)hc is/are
the owner(s) in fee simple of said premises; that they are free from all encumbrances Except: Subject to all
existing patent reservations, easements, right of way, protective covenants, zoning ordinances, and applicable
building codes, Jaws and regulations.

and that (s)bc will warrant and defend the same from all lawful claims what5oevor.

Datcq: F\.\bruary 5,1999
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t.

"EXHIBIT A"
Par;d l:

/\ p;ircd ?f la11li Joca.led in_H,c Southeast qunrter, Section 25, Township SO North, Range 6 West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County,
1.'.li,ho, i:aid p;m,cl .ucmg "1 n,c1 7" us shown on the Record of Survey flied in Dook 4 of Surveys, !It pngc 26, records ofKootc:nni

Lounty, more pm·t,cul.idy dc!,cnbcd us follows:

COMMENCING ftt the Southeast corner, said Section 25, from which the East quarter comer, said Section 25, beuts North 00°42'06"
East, a distance of26'!5,32 feot; thence
Nonh 44°38'06" West
description; thence

li

distance of 1846.72 feet to the Southwest comer, snid "Tract 7", the True Point of Bcglrining forth ls

Along the boundar)' linQs of said "Tract 7" the following four courses:
>lonh 00"22'55" East~ distance of662.S3 feet;

North 89°3 8'49" East n distance of 658, 75 fcot;
South 00"32'26" West & di.tance of662.39 foot;
South 89°37'54" West n distance of656.86 feet to tile True Point ofBeslnnlng.
RESERVING THEREFROM 1hat portion of the abo\1c describe.cl pal'C(!f which is described in nn Ingress, Egress nnd Utllltes E11sement
as more fully dci,cribud in E~hibit "B" attached hereto nnd incorpon\led herein.
f'URTHER RESERVING n1UrnFROM u strip of land rifiecn (15) foet In wid1h paralleling the south boundary line of said Parco! I
which sh.iii ~crvc ns ,m c~sumc111 for dectrlc utilites over lund and underground and lhc maintcn1mce of same.

Pare~! 2:

A parcel of lnnd loc,ncd in 1l1e Southeast tJU<1Mer, Section 2S, Township 50 North, Range 6 West, Boise Meridian, Kootcnni County,
tdal:o, ;aid po1rccl l>clng ''Trnct 8" us st.own on the Record of Survey nted In Book 4 of Surveys, Ht page 26, records ofKootcn11i

c,,unl)',

111<irc

purlicularly described as follows:

COMMENCING at the Somheast comer, said Section 25, from which the East quarter comer, said Section 25, bears North 00•42'06"
East, n dist,mcc of2645.32 feet; thence
North 11°45'38" West a distance of2079.81 feet to the Southeast comer, snid "Tract 8", the True Point of Beginning for this
description; thenco
Along the bound"ry lines of s.iid "Tract 811 the following four courses:
Nunh 00°32'26" East a distance of 660.56 feet:
South 89°39'44" West n distance of660.64 feet;

Soulh 00"22'55" West a distance of660.70 feet;
North 89"38'49" East~ distance of658.75 foet to the True Point of Beginning.
RESERVING THEREFROM u strip of land sixty (60) feet in width paralleling the north boundary line of Parcel 2 which shall
serve ilS an casement for ingress, egress and utilities.
TOGETHER WITH a sixty foot easement of the purpose of ingress, csress and utililies ulong the north boundary line ofTrnct 9,
legally described in Exhibit "C" and west ofihe Ingress, Egress and Utilitcs E11scment describer.! in Exhibit "B".

SAID EASEMENTS and all conditions and restrictions relating thereto shall be considers as running with the lnnd and shall bind
the grantees and its heirs, executors, and mlministrators, and all fu1urc assigns of said premises or uny part or puns thereof.

i..,f.flfor
JOl)J/90
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BJ\."i-ffflfl' @.
<Xnrr.rtzsn, l!n~ and UtiliU2.l.'J ~ )
A {-'<lrcol ,:,f lnnd lo~t.8>::1 in th~ S\'>uthe.1.1 Quutw~ Sett.itn 25, Townlb(p 50 Notth1 P.nngg tS Wett, ~
Mbrid.u:n. !{oc¢c.'\al County. ldubo, merre pmti~ delorlbsd u follows:
60 (r.,''j,-i,_,,\
A 1.trip of .I.And ii{;~f!fl.jf.fu<:t widl:h. 'tho oe.nterlm1::1 of which 1: i\trth.r dM.cl.1bed WI COM.MltNCJ:N:G ~t
tjio Sotlttl~r.t COrt'l-3r, r.s.id Sli!C',•.foa 25, ~p,:,Jat a!t:0 belngdlo 8autbcut oon.w.rof'T111ct 12.. u sbowr1 cin
the ~ r d of Survey filed in i'$ook 4 l::li' Surve;fti, at ti'~ Z6. ~ o f ~ County. 6.-on1 which the
S0utf1 Qua.roor comer, ~d ~ 25 1 bwi, 8 8Po36'03" WA d i ~ ot'2612.00 fftt; ~
S89"'36'05" W nlm1g the South line of the S01.rtbtut ~ r . sa.Jd Seaion 25, a dimmco of708.12 feet to
tJlo ~ or Bakl Satuh .lloe with the ~liM ofan cotlltuut l:Olld u deaoribod bl the State of ldaho
l:!i~t filod &.c ln.ct:rumc:nt Nu.mbez- 1455397. Reoon!; o f l ~ Cou.nty, and th~ True l?OINT-OP~
.Ul3-0lNN1NG fur this ~rlptlon,

m

The,:ioe, northerly along said e-em:nrlino th$ f u ~ OOUrwt~
.N 0.:)"2~'56" Ea dici.."'!l1ee rd''1l.72 ~
N 0& 0 16119"W n dl~af'l70.39 t~
N oov:21•01 11 Ea d.i.wtwieb of:nu;g ~ i

N 12'151'41" Ea distance of86.93 n«;
N 01°36'12" W a dlr.t:tnCb nf'56l,l71\lu.;
N2I"14'24" Bti d i ~ ofl05.2Stbct;
'N 3 St.:31 '44" B n m!'.,,um.oo af' 101U2 k ;
N 02"35'09" w a dl.ub.u:103 or J73.S6 ~ ;
N 23°.:?;'3.1 11 W a diffll1tet, of 5l.64-.k:
N l l ..Os,'Oott W a tlimml;)ij of SS.S4 ~
N 12"13'40" Ea dir.rancem-st.16 ~
- N 34°04'39" B a ~ o£'S>7.00 ~
N 27°19'22' ~ a <l:ii;bwcei of 107.92 ~
N 38°30'55" lh clltua,oeof4Sl.27 ht;
N 6S0 U'3S" B s d.ittiuicx, of 131.84 foot;
N 58°l3'11 11 gQ 6.isb.uie6ofl6l.8lfout;
N 00°42'24" Ee dktrumo of 52.24 k;
N 71 °49'2S" W a dli:um~ '1t 155 .2~ ht;
N S6 11 10'47" W a diztanoe of'143.61 !Mt;
N 31~1'~3'' W Q dI~oa etf76,76 mt;
N l.5"S2'S2" W :s dhunco ot U6.:n ~

•'

theao.,, N 23°23'17" W .t d.lstmioe of92.32 k_ tnx:inJ or l*, to the ~ (If A i d ~ wftft th&
Norm linia of the SO\lth.c,ut Qu~. said SectiOA 25 ('11111.d 1hio 11111<) bclca tho Nottb lm• ot ~ £!" aa
shown oo ~id .R,;oord ofSu.rvoy}, t:bt rom-r.oJr..TWtMlNU!, fl\im Wf»f.oh th.II But Quarttr~, ooid
S~tioo 15, ln1:n N 809 38'01" Ea diirum.oeof410.4,g ~

The d d ~ of said ltrlp of land to b e ~ ot ~ to befiln ct the South 11.nc, of wd
Soutbeut Qtlarter~ mid Bhorter.Deid or c,;,ctend,:,d to 'tel"rolnmo at the North~ of Aid Southeat
~ (soo Exhibit~~ attaohed ~o. and b y ~ made a part hereof).
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"EXRIBIT C.11

1S76~9l.

;, pmnJ of hmd locnrcd in the Southeust qunr1er, Section 2S, Township SO Not1h, Runge 6 West, Boise .Meridian, Kootenai County,
itl;1ho, said parcel being ''Traci 9" 1,s shown 0111/-ie Record of Survey tiled In !look 'I of Sur~eys, at page 26, records of Kootenai
Cou111y, 111orc- p:inicul:,dy described ns foffows:
COMMENCING
at the Southeast
corner, said Section 25, &om which the East quarter corner, said Section 25, bears North 00°42'06"
Eost
a distance of:2645.32
feet; thence
North J7°45'38" West a distance of2079,8J feet to the Southwest corner, said "Tract 9" the True Point of Be.ginning for this
description;
llic11cc

A long tile botmduy Jines of snid "Trnct 9" the followhig four courses;
North 00"32'26" Bast a distance of660.SG fee!;
North 89°39'44" East n distance of660.6S foot:
So,ith 0(J 0 42'0G" West a distance of 660.4 l feet:

Sou!h 89.38'49" West

11

distance of6SB.76 feet t,;1 the True Point of Beginning.

'tH}•lfjw
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